Part 2: Refugees and migration to and within the Middle East and North-Africa

For hundreds of years, conflicts in the MENA region and beyond have forced people to flee, creating what Chatty calls “the earliest ‘Western’ refugee regime” (Chatty, 2013: 50). After the collapse of the Ottoman empire, many of today’s borders were established. However, the creation of these new borders were entangled with colonial processes, and in some instances led to situations where people who had moved or been displaced ended up in new countries that considered them to be foreigners. One example is the issue of the Palestinian displacement, which also gave rise to the specific international framework designed to handle Palestinian refugees, UNRWA. Other examples are Iraqi refugees still displaced from the first and second Gulf war, Yemenis fleeing ongoing war, Kurds fleeing repression, Libyans fleeing flares of conflict, as well as the massive displacement from Syria, and now most recently the large movement driven by the Sudanese war, the Palestinian genocide, as well as displacement and re-displacement in Lebanon. This is not even touching on the massive movements of people from beyond the immediate MENA-region, as the countries in the region also sees influx of large numbers of refugees from Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa.

The region is host to so many refugees that scholars have termed it a “super camp”. However, many of the countries have not signed the Refugee Convention, and how refugees are dealt with differs widely from the Turkish approach of ratifying the convention and offering asylum (and using the large numbers of refugees present as a “threat” to pressure for other international, political gains) to the complete refusal of refugee status, accepting only migrant workers (such as in the case of Qatar) some of whom might have been eligible for refugee status. 

There are many potential reasons why countries, especially Arab states, hesitate to sign the Refugee Convention without reservations.. One is the sheer scale of displacement in the region. Offering full integration of refugees could significantly change the demographic of host communities. In addition, to many the issue of integration of refugees is also seen as directly undermining the Palestinian right to return, which to many Arab states has been a red line. In international debates, the politicisation of refugee law is mixed with issues of race and racism, colonial history and perceived Western biases. Further, migration and displacement within and from the MENA region is discussed in relation to capitalism, imperialism, and challenges the concept of the nation-state. The Middle East region provides many opportunities to engage in these critical discussions.

In processes labelled as “border externalization” (especially) the EU collaborates with states around the Mediterranean to stop migrants from crossing the Mediterranean Sea and entering Europe. Turkey is a prime example, and Sudan was involved in similar efforts before the revolution. Since the outbreak of war in Sudan, Egypt has started cooperating with the EU and now gets funding to increase its border security. News stories about a ‘refugee crisis’ have painted a picture of scores of migrants coming from or going through the MENA region on their way to Europe. Yet, the reality is that migration within and to the MENA countries is many, many times larger than the flow of people heading to Europe.

In the Middle East, where people come from and which country they go to strongly influence the gender balance of migrants. F.ex. in the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), due to racialised hierarchies, non-Arab Asian and East African women often end up in domestic work, while men make up the majority of the work force in the construction industry. These job patterns paired with gendered labour laws have led to a situation where close to 70% or more of the population in some GCC countries are men.

Overall, the MENA region has complex migration flows. Many countries, especially outside the GCC, both send and receive migrants, and are also central transit hubs. The reasons for migration are mixed and complex, and we need research that uses a variety of methods to fully understand it. Despite the complexities of migration and displacement within the MENA region, scholars point to how knowledge hierarchies privilege knowledge produced in Global Northern institutions over local institutions, and that Global Southern research is often treated as “case studies”. This is visible also in the central journals on migration and refugees with low representation of Middle Eastern and North African authors despite articles being on the MENA.

The politics of numbers: demographics and migration

On paper, the MENA region hosts a large number of forcefully displaced and other migrants. However, the official numbers are only part of the picture. Official demographic data have shortcomings we need to look into. While data collection issues frequently occur in all regions with large displaced populations, political motives can also influence how the population statistics are presented. For example,  many GCC states do not release detailed data on the make-up of the population, possibly to downplay the size of certain groups. Other countries may have reasons to inflate the numbers of f.ex. refugees or displaced persons. Inflating these numbers can be a way to gain geopolitical leverage, or to pressure the international community – especially the EU in the countries bordering on the Mediterranean -  to increase support.

The politics of demography are closely linked to the challenges certain host communities in the region are experiencing, especially in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. These countries have seen large influx of refugees from Syria, and Lebanon and Jordan in particular have long hosted displaced Palestinians, and to some degree Iraqis. In these cases, the international response has sometimes led to perceptions that the refugees get better service provision than the local population which may drive social tensions and increasing anti-refugee sentiments. This is tension is linked to poor national economies, and the sense of crisis that already exists in the host communities is worsened by the arrival of large numbers of refugees. These cases highlight the need for a well-planned international response to support neighboring countries carrying much of the burden of displacement. Similar issues are beginning to emerge in Egypt, with the arrival of Sudanese and Palestinians fleeing wars, on top of existing communities of refugees and other categories of migrants. The recent escalation in relation to Israeli aggression could also lead to a disastrous push of people back into Syria, though this has not yet been studied and is so far based on assumptions.

The Middle East is currently one of the regions with the highest number of displaced persons, including refugees, IDPs, labor migrants, and other types of migrants. The situation is made even more challenging by the deepening economic crises in major host countries, like Turkey, Lebanon, and Egypt. On top of this, ongoing conflicts in the region – whether active or simmering – raise concerns about further destabilization, both from direct warfare and from the large demographic shifts that can lead to questions about state sovereignty. This dynamic can be described as “politics of numbers.”

Central trackers and sources of data on migration include the IOM’s World Migration Report which covers forced displacement and labour migration, as well as remittances. The IOM relies on national reporting. The UNHCR’s instant reporting provides data on registered refugees and IDPs. Mixed Migration Centre offers annual reporting on mixed migration. The Arab Barometer further tracks “emigration desires” which gives an overview of peoples expressed desire to migrate.

Despite these tools it is still hard to get a good overview of migration numbers. UNHCR tracks registered refugees and regularly updates their monitors.  This provides an idea of migration patterns, especially in the Sudanese case. However, many people cross international borders without  registering as refugees, making it difficult to track these movements accurately. This is why it is important to look beyond numbers and official statistics. These statistics also do not give any indication of the conditions that refugees and migrants live under, or even the legal regimes they face.

Refugees in the MENA

The prime example of refugees and protracted displacement is the case of the Palestinians, displaced since the 1948 nakba and following waves of war, acts of aggression and settler-colonialism. There is extensive research on the topic, and the field of Palestine studies covers many aspects of displacement, playing a central role in the study of forced displacement and shaping much of the literature on refugees and forced displacement. While the Palestinian case remains highly relevant, it may also have drawn attention away from other displaced groups and areas within the MENA region. Following the crisis in Syria, there has been more research on displaced Syrians, although much of this research is coloured by the European “securitization” concerns. Research shows how Syrians have settled and participate to varying degrees in their host communities, especially in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon, countries that are now home to large groups of Syrian refugees. In some areas, the Syrian refugees have joined refugee populations already facing challenges, such as Palestinians and Iraqi in Jordan or South Sudanese, Congolese, and Eritreans in Sudan, creating tensions and conflict with these communities. While the refugee frameworks ideally should ensure equal treatment for all based ontheir legal status, international engagement, especially for Syrians, has led to differential treatment for refugees within the same host country.   

The issue of encampment is important to study in the MENA region, where many refugees are hosted in camps. The Palestinian case is again central to understanding these dynamics.. One of the key issues is protracted displacement, which leads to long-term camp camp-living for many refugees. Some large camps have organically transformed into semi-permanent urban areas, and managing these spaces is complex as governance in these camps involves interactions among  residents, NGOs, local and national governments; as well as international organisations like UNRWA (for Palestinians) and UNHCR.

The Middle East as a whole has been described as a “super camp” in which the entire region acts as a holding-zone for migrants, shaped by (in part) EU policies designed to keep refugees in place rather than offering them protection.

Although many refugees live in camps, the large majority live in cities where they receive less support from humanitarian actors and donors. In some places, like Egypt, there are no camps at all. Instead, refugees and migrants settle in urban areas with large informal sectors that are expected to absorb these groups.

Refugees’ rights to work, access education, and receive health care are contentious issues in most contexts, especially in countries where the economy is too weak to provide such services for their own citizens. In such cases, international pressure and/or financing to provide services for refugees can lead to increased aggression and outright violence towards them.

It is also important to note that forced displacement is not synonymous with refugee status. Many displaced people (like many Sudanese) are not registered as refugees or asylum seekers. Instead, they live independently under various regimes of legal and/or “illegalized” migration rules. As discussed in the section on key terms, there are also large numbers of people displaced within their own countries who do not fall under the definition of refugee. In addition to the number of people not registered or categorized as refugees, there are a large number of states in the Arabian Peninsula, particularly, that have not ratified the Refugee Convention, and due to these reasons it is important to move beyond the framework of refugee/ forced displacement studies in order to understand displacement in the region.

In the GCC countries especially, research on refugees and forced displacement is limited largely because these states have not signed the Refugee Convention and therefore do not offer asylum (rare exceptions exist). Labour migration has been the main focus of research in this region, yet there are significant groups of people who might be termed ad-hoc refugees (refugees by default, although not registered as such) across the GCC.

So far there has not been a coordinated international response to meet the needs of the people who have fled from the war in Sudan. Instead they have been met with various national or local initiatives, ad hoc camp solutions (like in Chad and South Sudan), informal self-settlement (in Egypt and South Sudan), pre-existing camps (in Ethiopia); and increasingly restricted borders that have led to a rise in human smuggling (especially to Egypt and Libya). Based on similar cases in Middle Eastern history, the outlook for the Sudanese displaced populations are dire.

Informal markets

Many forcibly displaced people in the region rely on the informal market to make a living and access services, often though informal jobs or small businesses,While this can offer economic opportunities and even benefit the local economy, informal work is usually insecure and comes with certain risks. 

Those working informally often face limited access to safe work conditions, unions, financing, and financial tools for running businesses. For those who don’t have bank accounts, this lack of access can lead to exploitation, such as costly, unregulated loans, fewer business opportunities, and unsafe ways to store money. Although there may be some options for microloans or small business funds, these typically rely on banks—even in cases using fintech—leaving those without banking access at a disadvantage.

Informal jobs lack formal contracts, leaving workers vulnerable to exploitation in the form of unsafe or illegal work tasks, underpayment or wage theft. In informal work the employment relationship is inherently unbalanced in terms of power as employers not only control work tasks but also hold extra power due to the job’s unofficial status.. While some employers may treat workers well, informal work lacks regulations to ensure fair treatment, leaving workers dependent on the goodwill of their employers. Exploitation can of course also happen in the formal job market, but the lack of  protection and mechanisms for complaint or legal recourse leave people with informal jobs extra vulnerable. In some instances the ultimate consequence of informal work may be imprisonment, or deportation.. Women in informal work face additional risks, as they are more vulnerable to sexual violence and are often isolated in domestic jobs, where they may have less support. Racial and ethnic discrimination is also a concern for people working informally, adding another layer of disadvantage as people may experience exclusion, or abuse on the basis of their ethnic or racial identity which may manifest as wage-discrimination, or outright violence without any recourse to dispute mechanisms or legal protection against discrimination.

Labour migration

Labor migration is central to understanding migration in the region. Although it is often seen as voluntary and temporary labour migration can also involve displacement and be long-term. While international law covers labour migration, it is mostly controlled by national and bilateral agreements.

Research on the Arabian Gulf urges us to question the definitions of migrant workers. While policies of the GCC countries are designed to ensure that all migrants present in the countries are employed, these systems can be abused, resulting in situations where people live in these countries without having a formal job. Since these countries have not ratified the Refugee Convention, they do not offer asylum. Although they do not offer asylum, these states still host people who might qualify as refugees elsewhere – for example in Saudi Arabia. Many Syrians fled there after war broke out, but they stay there under labour migration rules and not as refugees. While the GCC countries may be criticized for refusing to recognize refugees, they do provide safety for those who can work. Historically, the Middle East has seen high levels of mobility within the region, and one of the grand visions of the Pan-Arabists was free mobility of both people and money across the Arab world. While this was not to be implemented, there has been a large number of labor migrants from the large populous countries in the western part of the region, to the less populated, oil-rich states in the eastern part of the region. The combination of large numbers of refugees, displaced peoples, short- and long term labor migrants, educational migrants, and the list goes on highlights the importance of examining how various migration governance regimes operate, and their effects on the people who move.

Precariousness is a key factor in understanding labour migration in the GCC, where migrant workers’ residence status is tied to their employment through the kafala (sponsorship) system which requires all migrants to be sponsored, usually by their employers. In this system, “protection” is more a privilege than a right, depending on the migrants’ continued employment. Martin Hvidt describes the GCC economies as “demand-driven”, meaning that in theory there should be no surplus of workers since workers who are unfit, unable or undesired will be sent out of the country. In practice this is not entirely the case, as research shows that informal workers can find ways to stay, either operating outside the formal system, or through personal sponsorship. This approach does however leave the workers extremely vulnerable to exploitation.

Many forcibly displaced people work as registered labor migrants across the GCC (and beyond). For example, Saudi authorities claim to host host “2,5 million Syrian refugees” in response to criticism over their lack of action during the 2015 Syrian crisis. These “refugees” are however labour migrants.

The kafala-system is widely criticized for creating an unequal power balance between employees and employers in which the migrants’ residence status is completely dependent on sponsorship. Paired with a complete lack of freedom of organization this leaves employees at the mercy of their employers. Despite sweeping reforms across the GCC states over the last decade, the basic power structure has not changed. Despite the risk of exploitation, the GCC remains an attractive destination for labor migration due to relatively higher salaries, and easier access for migrants from the MENA region, without the humiliating and stringent assessments required to seek asylum in the EU or North America. The endless need for labour in the GCC provides opportunities for both high and low skilled workers.