Part 3: Sudan as recipient and sending country, a long history of migration studies

Sudan has a long history of migration, both as a destination and a source of migrants, due to its strategic location and continuous history of conflict. Contemporary Sudan largely consists of people with immigrant roots. Starting with the Bact Treaty of 640 which allowed Arabs to settle in the current central and riverine Sudan, waves of migrants, especially from West Africa and the Maghreb have flocked to Sudan. These trends continue, especially with conflicts in neighboring countries like Chad and the Central African Republic. Shared cultural ties across the borders also contribute to people crossing into Sudan and integrating in local communities. Sudan's population reflects a complex mix of cross-border and cross-continental connections, including groups like the Hausa from Nigeria and other West African communities such as the Zabarma and Takarir, who have settled in regions like Darfur and Kassala. Sudan’s diverse migration history therefore makes it a uniquely interesting case for studies of migration and forced displacement.

Sudan has a long history of migration. In fact, about 40 % of the total population is believed to travel or relocate every year for various reasons and periods of time. This movement has deep historical roots, often linked to environmental changes, livelihood strategies, and the country’s long history of conflict. For example, large-scale displacement, forced conscription, and conflict along ethnic lines were common already during the Mahdist period (1881-1898).

Migration caused by conflict is not a new phenomenon in Sudan, but it got more intense starting in the late 1980s. Since then, famines and civil wars have been the main reasons people decide to leave their homes. Civil war in South Sudan (1955-1972. 1983-2005), Darfur (2003-) and recurrent conflicts in other parts of Sudan (mainly due to tribal and ethnic strife) have displaced millions of people, either to the outskirts of towns within Sudan or to neighbouring countries. normally in the peripheral areas of towns, or as refugees into neighboring countries and further afield. During the 1990s and due to the intensification of civil war in South Sudan and the manner in which the Sudanese government dealt with the internally displaced persons in Khartoum, increasingly Sudanese sought to leave the country and seek asylum. In the 1990s, as the civil war in South Sudan worsened and the Sudanese government mishandled the situation of displaced people in Khartoum, more Sudanese began leaving the country to seek asylum abroad.

Being a sending and receiving country

During the 1960s and 1970s, many people from Chad, Congo, Ethiopia, and Eritrea fled to Sudan because of civil war in their countries. Refugees from these nations have continued to arrive to date, and were joined by South Sudanese after civil war broke out there in 2013 When war broke out in Sudan in April 2023, many refugees, including Syrians who had recently made Sudan their home, were displaced yet again.  Along with them, many Sudanese also fled, creating complicated patterns of movement into neighboring countries. Some refugees, like Ethiopians and Eritreans, have lived in Sudan for decades and blended into local communities despite the country’s policy against granting citizenship to refugees. Some of them have found their way through connections and bribes.  Syrians, on the other hand, were treated differently under pro-Arab Islamist policies, though some cases of citizenship were revoked after Sudan's political changes in 2019. While the Sudan Refugee Act of 1974 confines refugees to certain locations (refugee camps) close to the borders of their country of origin, it allows them to work in agriculture or other livelihoods in the communities where camps are located. Some refugees move to towns or major cities and blend, aided by fellow refugees or relatives who made it to these places. Some of them may use towns as steppingstones for further journeys.

The outbreak of war in April 2023 has further prompted “re-displacement” of people seeking refuge from other conflicts. One example is Syrians who chose to flee to Sudan because it was one of very few countries that did not require a visa. Another example is South Sudanese who fled their country’s 2013 civil war and have now been displaced yet again by the ongoing conflict in Sudan.

Ironically, while Sudan hosts many refugees, it also sends refugees to the same countries that send people to Sudan. This “refugee-circulation” is central to understanding the complex flows of forced displacement. The first civil war in Sudan (1955-1972) forced people from South Sudan to seek refuge in Uganda, Kenya, and Congo. The Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 allowed the return of South Sudanese refugees to Sudan, but when civil war resumed in 1983 people were pushed out again, making some refugees for the second time and shattering the dream of return of others. This repeated cycle of displacement has continued, with Sudan and South Sudan taking turns as both sources and hosts of refugees. These migration trajectories underline the complexity of mixed migration/displacement and challenge the conceptual toolbox of migration and forced displacement studies. Sudan’s role makes it a critical area for migration and forced displacement studies, as seen in Barbara Harrell-Bond’s foundational work on refugee aid in South Sudan. Today, Sudan serves as both a hub for migration and a place to rethink how we understand these global issues.

The labels refugee and IDP do not cover all the types of migration to and from Sudan. Labour migration is also a common people’s movement and can sometimes blur the lines between categories. Sudan, again, is both a sender and receiver of labour migrants. Like many other countries in the region, Sudan has a significant expatriate population in the Gulf countries and has been a provider of manpower to the GCC since the beginning of the oil-boom. The oil-boom in the GCC coincided with the deterioration of Sudan’s economy. Sudanese workers have made significant contributions to several sectors in the GCC, especially education and security. While migration to the GCC is typically for work purposes, the flow of migrants from Sudan to the Gulf has increased during times of conflict in Sudan. This highlights the need to look beyond categories when analyzing migration flows. In addition, migration to the GCC (or elsewhere) can also provide relief from political repression particularly after the Islamist regime took power through a military coup in 1989. Political repression and nepotism in Sudan's labour market meant that only those who were loyal could get jobs. Others had to seek opportunities abroad. As a result, it is difficult to distinguish between ‘voluntary’ and ‘forced’ migration in the Sudanese context. In fact, the experience of Sudanese migrants in the Gulf suggests that forced and voluntary migration exist on a spectrum, influenced by factors like political instability and general insecurity.

Sudanese have continued to migrate to the Gulf countries even after Sudan started producing and exporting oil in 2003. However, the oil boom attracted a new group of migrants to Sudan, particularly from Asian countries like Philippines, Indonesia, and Bangladesh, and African countries such as Ethiopia and Eritrea. These migrants primarily work in the domestic sector and are mainly based in major cities like Khartoum. Women from the Philippines, Indonesia, and Ethiopia represent the core of domestic workers in Sudan. Men from Bangladesh have also taken on such roles, but due to Sudan’s conservative culture, domestic work is mainly carried out by female migrants. This type of migration came to a halt in 2011 when Sudan lost the bulk of its oil fields to South Sudan after its secession. The sharp downturn in the Sudanese economy made Sudan less attractive to migrants seeking economic opportunities. Although this particular type of migration largely came to an end, it highlights the complexity of the Sudanese situation when it comes to migration studies.

Within Sudan, access to basic services and safety is severely limited due to the collapse of national infrastructure and ongoing conflict. While some regions are safer than others, large-scale displacement causes immense pressure on local communities and resources, leading to further tensions. Lack of access to humanitarian aid, climate issues, and destruction of crops due to the war have deepened the humanitarian crisis. The multi-layered, multi-dimensional nature of displacement within and from Sudan under the current war is a prime example of the shortcomings of both definitions, international and regional legal instruments, and research to capture the depth of human suffering which leads to migration and results from the failures of the infrastructure for migration in all its forms.

Does Sudan have migration policy?

Despite being a sending, receiving, and transit country, Sudan does not have a clear migration policy. However, in recent years the Sudanese government has paid increased attention to migration governance. It has participated in several global, interregional, regional and sub-regional processes. Representatives from the authorities have also taken part in bilateral initiatives with other countries focusing on promoting investment, student exchange, return of refugees, regulation of labour migration and reduction of irregular migration. The National Population Council of Sudan is responsible for  coordinating strategies related to migration, displacement and population movement in line with the National Population Policy. Sudan is also part of the EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative, known as the Khartoum Process. This initiative is often seen as a key framework for the EU’s strategy to externalize its borders.

The Khartoum Process is part of the EU’s engagement in Africa, focusing heavily on security and migration control. Known as “The EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative, the Khartoum Process was launched in Rome in November 2014. Its main goal was to take concrete actions to address human trafficking and smuggling of migrants between the Horn of Africa and Europe. However, the Khartoum process has been criticized for relying on a managerial, project-based approach rather than focusing on the complex realities of mixed migration in the Horn of Africa.

Despite  hosting millions of refugees, Sudan does not have a unified migration policy. There are systemic weaknesses in Sudan’s law and practice, which cast serious doubts on Sudan’s ability to combat trafficking and smuggling in line with international standards, and its reliability as a partner in “migration management”. The Khartoum Process has faced criticism for potentially undermining the EU’s commitment to human rights in its external policies. It risks entangling the EU in human rights violations within the region. The initiative is also criticized for being a top-down approach that prioritizes the interests of European and Horn of Africa states—though not equally—without adequately considering the impact of these policies on the rights and lives of migrants.

There are additional issues with the Khartoum Process. One of the major challenges is that it puts the responsibility for protecting the human rights of migrants and refugees on the same countries that violate these rights and drive forced migration. For example, Sudan has repeatedly taken measures that are in conflict with its obligations under the Refugee Convention and other international agreements. On several occasions, also after 2014, people from neighboring countries, especially Eritrea, have been prosecuted for entering Sudan illegally under the 1994 Passports and Immigration Act and, and from 2015 under the new Passports and Immigration Act, which grants broad powers to deport individuals without judicial oversight. The technical assistance provided through the Khartoum Process to enhance border control risks exposing smuggled or trafficked persons to abuse by Sudanese border guards. Studies have shown that the Rapid Support Forces benefitted from the technical and financial support provided by the Khartoum Process, particularly for their role in patrolling the Sudan-Libya border starting in 2014. More research is needed to fully understand the impact of these border control policies on the rights of refugees and asylum seekers, as well as the legal aspects, smuggling and trafficking implications of these measures.

Existing legal frameworks

Sudan has committed to the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) leading to its participation in the Global Compact for Migration. As part of this commitment, Sudan has signed several international agreements, including the Refugee Convention – and Sudan is signatory to the Refugee convention and does grant asylum to recognized refugees, although violations, amongst other things, against the principle of non-refoulement have been reported.

 

International frameworks

1. Convention on the Status of Refugees for the year 1951 and 1967 Protocol
2. Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Special Aspects of Refugees in Africa of the year 1969
3. Forced Labor Convention No. 29 of the year 1930 (International Labor Organization)
4. Abolition of Forced Labor Convention No. 105 of the year 1957 (International Labor Organization)
5. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime of the year 2000

Bilateral Agreements

Sudan has signed bilateral agreements with governments of sending and receiving countries. Such agreements have covered aspects of facilitation of return and freedom of movement including labor.

1. Tripartite Agreements with UNHCR and governments of Ethiopia in 2000 and Chad in 2017 to facilitate return of refugees to countries of origin.
2. Agreements on Labor migration with: Ethiopia and Jordan (2003); Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, Yemen, Libya (2012) and Djibouti (2014).
3. Agreements on freedom of movement: Egypt (2004); South Sudan (2012) and Libya (2013).

National Legislation

1. Law of the year 2014 on asylum and refugee affairs replacing Law 1974
2. Law of the year 2004 on citizenship issues
3. Law of the year 1997 on labor migration
4. Law of the year 2014 on combating trafficking in persons
5. Law of the year 1994 on migration and passports

Despite being signatory to the different international conventions and bilateral agreements on migration and refugee issues, a lot is still needed when it comes to policies. The Refugees and Asylum Act of 1974 (amended in 2014) remains to be one notable document relating to policy on refugees. Sudan has an open-door policy towards forced migrants fleeing unrest. But a key challenge is that the responsibility for migrants and migration is fragmented and divided across a multitude of governmental institutions. This makes accountability and implementation opaque and partial.

Sudanese diaspora

Civil wars after Sudan’s independence and escalating conflicts in the 1980s, 1990s, and beyond led many Sudanese to join the growing African diaspora. Early studies on the Sudanese diaspora focused on communities in the Gulf countries, North America and Europe diasporic Sudanese communities, and primarily just on the descriptive level. For example, research on the Sudanese diaspora in the United States and Canada explored how these communities formed, how people migrated to North America, their interactions with host societies, their coping strategies, and how they did compared to other diaspora groups. These studies focused on earlier waves of Sudanese migrants who emigrated to North America in the early 20^th century, the first- and second-generation diaspora. In the European context, early studies on Sudanese diaspora examined factors leading Sudanese to leave Sudan for Norway. The challenges they faced in transit locations and after their arrival to Norway were analyzed, such as continuing education, finding a job, and adapting to their new surroundings. A key focus was also on religion and homemaking practices, seen through ceremonial gatherings, marrying within the Sudanese community, and creating an environment that reminded them of home.

Some studies on the Sudanese diaspora focus on how these communities mobilize and imagine their homeland. They explore how Sudanese migrants form their identity in relation to the connections they maintain with their country of origin. From a constructivist perspective, diasporas form when mobilization towards a ‘homeland’ initiates the process of collectively imagining that homeland. These mobilizing agendas have been analyzed as either emotional and/or political and correspond to processes of collective remembering, forgetting, or future-making. Key questions in this context include: What unites people in the Sudanese diaspora? What shared visions draw them towards their shared homeland(s)? Research shows how seemingly conflicting processes of identity formation can overlap and co-exist within the same ‘national’ migrant community. These studies also show how different mobilizing agendas initiate imaginative processes of ‘past-making’ and ‘future-making’ which correspond to various types of diasporic identity. 

Diaspora studies often explore topics like remittances and financial aspects. Studies of these topics are not limited to Sudanese diaspora communities but are also seen in other groups, such as the Somali diaspora. There are studies on remittances by Somali and Sudanese diasporas. This research shows the economic power diasporas have through the money they send back home, both through formal and informal channels. Another area of focus is the political engagement of diaspora communities, particularly whether they play positive or negative roles in conflicts in their countries of origin. While these issues have been addressed in earlier studies on the Sudanese diaspora, they remain relevant due to the continuing conflict in Sudan. Given the continuing and protracted conflicts in Sudan, there is a need to shift the research focus from Sudanese diasporas in Europe and North America (the Global North) to countries in the Global South. For example, there is a big Sudanese diaspora in Egypt which has grown significantly due to the 2023 civil war in Sudan. Earlier studies on Sudanese diaspora in Egypt include the interesting work of Anita Fabos “Brothers or Others”.  While the Egyptian government describes the Sudanese as "brothers" in a united Nile Valley, recent political developments in Egypt have highlighted the vulnerable legal status of Sudanese in Cairo, who exist in a grey area -neither citizens nor foreigners. The precarious situation has worsened since the 2023 war in Sudan, making it essential to revisit earlier works such as those of Fabos. There is also a need for more research on the Sudanese diaspora in the Gulf. The ongoing war in Sudan has also led to the formation of new diaspora communities in countries like Uganda, Kenya, and South Sudan where Sudanese refugees have now joined the smaller communities that existed before the current conflict.

In recent years, several studies on the Sudanese diaspora in Europe have focused on topics such as family connections, caregiving, diaspora welfare practices, and transnational protection. Since 2019, Sudanese diaspora’s engagement with home politics increased. For example, Sudanese medical doctors in the UK were active after 2019 in mobilizing resources for the medical sector in Sudan. Here, there are several levels that can be looked at, and there are some studies that have already looked at this engagement: diaspora’s increased contribution to political movements and humanitarian support. This is not only confined to resource mobilization by diaspora communities for supporting urgent humanitarian needs in conflict areas but also includes advocacy work and putting pressure on local and international actors to stop wars or mitigate their impacts. These are new areas for research that need to be added to earlier and recurrent questions.

The April 2023 war

The war that broke out in Sudan in April 2023 has caused one of the worst humanitarian crises in recent history. Figures by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) for July 2024 reveal that 10.7 million persons have been displaced across Sudan. IOM estimates that 27% of internally displaced persons (IDPs) have been forced to flee multiple times. Around 2.2 million people have become refugees in neighboring countries. Most IDPs (35%) are from Khartoum where the war began. The majority of IDPs are in Darfur (39%) and over half of IDPs (52%) are children under the age of 18.

South Sudan, Chad, and Egypt have received nearly 1.9 million. refugees, while Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea have taken in smaller but still significant numbers. While many Sudanese are officially recognized refugees in these countries, conditions vary, and the willingness to provide protection is weakening. In Egypt, Sudanese were initially able to secure visas upon -arrival, and many had existing networks that facilitated their escape. However, the Egyptian government quickly responded to the growing pressure on their southern border by suspending the Egyptian-Sudanese bilateral “Four Freedoms” agreement, effectively cutting off all legal pathways for Sudanese to cross the border into Egypt. In addition, Sudanese communities in Egypt face growing discrimination and demonization, as well as targeted efforts to undermine Sudanese businesses and services like privately organized schools for Sudanese children. In Chad, refugees face dire conditions, as there has been little international response, and the Chadian government lacks the resources to address the massive humanitarian crisis.  Refugees are struggling to meet even basic needs. This is also the case in certain border communities along the border to South Sudan, where for example supply chains for basic goods have been severely disrupted by the same war that is forcing people to flee. While international humanitarian organisations try to offer relief through cash transfers, there are no goods for the refugees to buy, leaving them in a desperate situation.  The Gulf countries are also hosting hundreds of thousands of Sudanese who are not recognized as refugees. Instead, they are granted residency based on their own or a family member’s employment.  Although the GCC countries have not signed the Refugee Convention and do not offer asylum, there have been initiatives to support the Sudanese fleeing from war. For example, the United Arab Emirates introduced the “Humanitarian Residence” programme for Sudanese nationals. This is a program that gives a person one-year renewable residence and allows a person to seek employment although there are no other benefits of the sort provided by countries that recognize refugees. These examples highlight the need to look “formal” categories when addressing such issues.

People displaced by war, whether internally displaced persons (IDPs) or refugees, share the experience of being affected by conflict. However, their situations vary so much that there is a need to take it into consideration when addressing the challenges they face. Factors like class, age, disabilities and chronic conditions, gender, sexual identity, ethnic and racial identity, pre-war refugee status, access to identity documents, as well as ability to draw on social networks all play a role in determining their ability to leave areas affected by violent conflict. These intersecting factors greatly impact not only whether someone can move but also their opportunities to cross borders and the strategies they use to survive and meet their basic needs during displacement.

Lessons/recommendations

While there are ample instruments for the governing of migration and refugees, there is a great way to go on harmonization: regional instruments tend to be more inclusive in their definitions, and implementation remains a challenge.

Global accountability structures are not really present meaning that non-conformity to international covenants is not sanctioned.

Within the MENA there is a way to go on recognizing refugees rights to protection, and even further in implementing these.                                                                                                                       

European governments has a responsibility to help uphold and ensure the safety of those displaced by war, especially wars such as that in Sudan which has direct links to European policy. This should be done both through comprehensive international humanitarian response and by resettling refugees from neighboring countries.

The international community should not engage non-democratic states with dismal human rights track records in border securitization.

The lesson learned from Sudan should be that funding militias and dictators for border security does not reduce migration, it rather further produces the conditions that produce migration.