From Battlefields to Breadlines: Sudan’s Food Security Crisis

As early as July 2023, just a few months after the eruption of the conflict in Sudan, A former government official said:

“If nothing is done soon, we will be facing starvation.”

A year later, Sudanese people are faced with the dire reality of risk of famine. On June 27, 2024, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) released a report painting a dire picture of food insecurity and malnutrition across Sudan amid the continued escalation and geographical spread of the conflict. Fourteen areas (localities of residents and clusters of internally displaced people and refugees) in nine states face the risk of famine, with parts of Khartoum, Al Jazirah, Greater Kordofan, and Greater Darfur bearing the highest risks. The IPC report indicates that 25.6 million people face crisis or worse conditions (IPC Phase 3 or above) between June and September 2024, with 755,000 people in catastrophic conditions (IPC Phase 5), primarily in North Darfur and Al Jazirah States, and another 8.5 million in emergency (IPC Phase 4) across Sudan. As the Norwegian Refugee Council’s Advocacy Manager in Sudan expressed:

“People are already dying of hunger. Our colleagues on the ground in Darfur report that pregnant women are losing their children due to malnutrition, and children are dying of hunger on a daily basis,”

The IPC report findings corroborate evidence from the International Food Policy Research Institute’s (IFPRI) on-ground monitoring of the impact of conflict on farmers, rural and urban households, and micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs). In April 2024, IFPRI and UNDP released results from the Rural Household Survey, showcasing that 59 percent of rural households across Sudan face moderate or severe food insecurity, and 12.5 percent face acute food insecurity between November 2023 and January 2024. Similarly, out of 3000 urban households, 46 percent were deemed severely food insecure according to the Urban Household Survey conducted by IFPRI in June and July 2024. According to the same survey, over 70 percent of urban households indicated that they are facing severe to moderate food insecurity in the states of North and East Darfur. The magnitude and drivers of food insecurity vary amongst regions in Sudan. States like West Kordofan, South Kordofan, Blue Nile, North Darfur and Khartoum recorded the highest food insecurity experience scores compared to safer states like Red Sea, Northern and River Nile States[1].

Conflict-induced complications such as the destruction of infrastructure and road blockages continue to severely limit populations’ access to basic nutritional needs and public services, and hinder access to food and humanitarian assistance. In view of the continued violence incidents and road blockages, households are often challenged not only in consumption of food but also production of crops; whereby 70 percent of households reported not cultivating land in 2023. A logistics company owner expressed that:

“I think people will plant only 30-40 percent of usual cultivated area this year [in 2023]. Farmers are being very cautious, and this will reduce the total food produced in Sudan!”

In non-conflict regions, the sharp reduction in income levels caused by job losses poses significant challenges to households’ purchasing power, 15 percent of rural households reported that they have shifted from employment to no employment between November 2023 and January 2024. A correspondent of AlJazeera News Channel reported in June 2024 that:

“More than half of working-aged Sudanese worked in non-formal sectors before the conflict. Lack of access to those jobs as fighting continues means many have lost their income.”

As of December 2023, estimates using an economy wide framework showed that Sudanese households would lose half of their income. These findings corroborate statements from people on the ground, whereby an employee of a large food processing facility mentioned in July 2023:

“Most of the industries are in and around Khartoum, which gave jobs to farmers, traders, and middlemen. A lot of people are living off Khartoum’s economy, and this has a huge impact on employment.”

More recent IFPRI data collected in 2024 signifies that 17 percent of breadwinners in urban households have no jobs. Although local markets remain functional in non-conflict areas, the loss of jobs and low-income levels vis a vis the soaring food prices, exacerbate the food access crisis across both conflict and non-conflict regions in Sudan. Due to the continued reduction in incomes of households in urban and rural Sudan, their constrained ability to purchase food even where available, urges the need for humanitarian assistance; as a grocery shop owner says to the BBC:

“Everything is very expensive: food, water, transport, education and the list goes on.”

The conflict has forced the displacement of more than 12 million people since April 2023. Sudan now counts 10.2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 2.2 million refugees, making it the biggest displacement crisis in the world today. In view of the continuation of the conflict, the demand for humanitarian assistance persists; both to host communities across borders and to internally displaced persons. A refugee from West Darfur said:

“While new camps had been built for the influx of people from West Darfur, the quality of water and food was poor.”

Besides the interventions of international humanitarian actors in the different states of the country, local organizations and community-based initiatives are equally ambitious in alleviating the multifaceted crisis. For example: leveraging crowdfunding and support from the Sudanese diaspora, the Central Kitchens initiative by Hadreen provides support to households and IDPs in affected areas; particularly in Khartoum, Al Jazirah, Sennar, North Kordofan and Northern States where approximately 59, 232 beneficiaries are reached on daily basis. A daily laborer based in Omdurman, in Khartoum State told Al-Jazeera:

“I come here [to a community kitchen] daily and sometimes go to other kitchens to get two meals a day.”

Violence and conflict have indeed disrupted agricultural production and agri-food processing [2], thus reducing the domestic supply of food products. In May 2023, IFPRI conducted an Agri-food Processors and Food Manufacturers survey with 15 large food processing firms operating in Khartoum and beyond. Due to the mass destruction of agri-food processing facilities in Khartoum at the onset of the conflict. In February 2024, a former employee of a private sector company said:

“We lost more than 750 million dollars in productive assets due to the burning down of our facilities.”

On a macroeconomic level, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), income levels, and employment have deteriorated drastically in 2023, leading to remarkable increases poverty and undernourishment. According to IFPRI’s economywide analysis, Sudan’s GDP is estimated to shrink by 46.8 percent if the war continues through 2024, compared to 2022’s GDP. This will imply poverty rate to increase by 21.2 percentage points by the end of 2024, pushing another 8.5 million people into poverty according to estimates provided by IFPRI researchers during the EcoMod 2024 Conference. Despite the increased poverty levels, IFPRI’s data signifies the resilience and adaptation of farmers in non-conflict areas whereby the production of some key crops such as sesame has increased in 2024 compared to 2023.

Amid the dark reality of Sudanese citizens and IDPs in Sudan, there is still room for a better tomorrow, particularly if agricultural production is effectively targeted. A collaborative effort between IFPRI and the World Bank, using RIAPA[3] economy-wide framework estimates the impact of the war, and proposes recovery strategies through 2028. These proposed solutions emphasize agricultural productivity, infrastructure investment, and social protection interventions. Agricultural revitalization is identified as a critical lever for recovery. Under the most optimistic scenario in which the reduction in GDP in 2023 is estimated at only 12 percent relative to 2022, over 4 million people would fall under the poverty line by 2028. However, restoring agricultural productivity to its pre-conflict levels could lift approximately 50 percent of these people out of poverty by 2028, highlighting the sector’s pivotal role in Sudan’s socioeconomic restoration.

To avert the looming famine, it is crucial to de-escalate the conflict between the SAF and the RSF to end market disruptions and restore aid distribution channels. Policies must prioritize restoring economic productivity through a multi-faceted approach that combines short-term relief with long-term investments. Enhancing agricultural productivity by providing seeds, fertilizers, and access to irrigation, as well as rehabilitating land damaged by combat, can boost agricultural output. Additionally, investing in critical infrastructure like roads and communication systems, along with attracting foreign investment, can expedite recovery. On the social protection front, direct financial support to households can alleviate poverty and stimulate consumer spending, positively impacting the domestic economy. These measures can enhance food security and mitigate the devastating impacts of the ongoing conflict in Sudan.

This Sudanese Perspectives blog post is written by Hala Abushama, Research Analyst with the Development Strategies and Governance Unit at the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), and Khalid Siddig, Senior Research Fellow in the Development Strategies and Governance Unit and Program Leader for the Sudan Strategy Support Program at IFRPI.

The views expressed in this post are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the SNAC project or CMI. 

[1] Rural Household Survey 2023 data was collected prior to the expansion of the conflict to Al Jazirah and Sennar States.

[2] Agri-Food Processing Firms Survey 2023 data was collected between May and June 2023 

[3] RIAPA is a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model that uses nested production structure, imperfect substitution of traded commodities, and linear expenditure systems of consumer demand. It models consumer and producer behaviors, respectively with utility and profit maximization, adjusting prices for market equilibrium. The model utilized the 2021 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for Sudan.