Book review: The Middle Class in Sudan

Atta El Bat'hani, professor in political science at University of Khartoum, has published the book The Middle Class in Sudan: An Introduction to Theory and Application (2024) in Arabic. Below you find a book review in English formulated by Azza Mustafa Babiker Ahmed, postdoctoral researcher at the Institute for Humanities in Africa (HUMA), University of Cape Town.

Overview
‘The Middle Class in Sudan: An Introduction to Theory and Application’ by Atta El Bat'hani is a timely book that presents a comprehensive understanding of the past, present, and future political landscape. El Bat'hani provided us with a book that represents years of extensive research on the middle class in Sudan, who are considered the main political power shaping the political and economic history of Sudan. In his book, El Bat'hani asserts that the historical responsibility for the fragmentation of national unity, the escalation of internal conflicts, and the failure to sustain the December Revolution momentum largely rests with the Islamic Inqadh regime. However, a considerable portion of this failure is also linked to the political class, primarily composed of the middle class. This middle class did not fulfil its historical role, especially compared to the accomplishments of the middle classes in other countries. The book's thesis, which is open to review and testing, suggests that the overall fragility of the middle class and the rise of a powerful Islamist faction to power, among other factors, have contributed to Sudan's prolonged instability. Furthermore, El Bat'hani emphasises the need for the political class to engage in self-critique, reassessing its theories and practices since independence.

The book is a meticulously researched and insightful exploration of the middle class in Sudan. It is well-structured, with each chapter examining different aspects of the middle class, from its historical evolution to its current state and prospects. El Bat'hani provides a thorough analysis, considering both theoretical and practical perspectives.  The following section provides a summary of the various chapters of the book, which was originally written in Arabic. This summary aims to make the content accessible to non-Arabic speakers. As I am not a professional translator, this text is based on my understanding of the Arabic content. Readers are invited to read the original book and form their interpretations.

Chapter 1: Social Evolution and Class Formation
This chapter explores the theoretical debates on the growth and development of social classes, focusing on the contexts, factors, and stages involved in class formation. El Bat'hani defines a social class as follows: "Social class is a group that shares a relatively similar position regarding the ownership or control of the means of production, as well as in terms of labour relations and work patterns. A class becomes more defined as its members develop an awareness of their common interests and strive to achieve them through organized movements and active participation."  El Bat'hani positions his work within several scholarly interpretations of social class, particularly those emphasising the role of economic and social factors in class formation. Many social scientists base their definitions of social class on similar criteria, such as ownership or control of the means of production, labour relations, and work patterns. This perspective is consistent with the Marxist framework, which El Bat’hani extensively engages with in this book, highlighting the economic foundations of class distinctions. Similar to scholars such as Chester L. Hunt and Paul B. Horton, El Bat’hani understand social class as a stratum of people who hold similar positions within the social status continuum, which includes factors like wealth, income, and occupation. The idea that a social class becomes more defined as its members recognise their shared interests and organise to pursue those interests relates to various theoretical perspectives and aligns with the concept of class consciousness, which is central to Marxist theory. Empirically, the concept of social class is determined by key factors associated with production relations. This includes the classification of classes as "class in itself," which refers to a group sharing common economic conditions, and "class for itself," which signifies a class that has developed a collective awareness and actively seeks to influence both the class structure and broader society. El Bat'hani also offers a detailed analysis of class formation in both industrial societies and the so-called Third World.

Chapter 2: The Middle Class: Definition and Historical Role
In this chapter, El Bat'hani defines the middle class, its historical role in capitalist societies, and its social mobility. In his view, the upper class owns economic resources and controls public affairs through its influence over state apparatuses. In contrast, the middle class occupies a position between the upper and lower classes, the latter consisting of workers and labourers. The lower class lacks ownership of resources and relies on working for the upper class, resulting in an antagonistic relationship between the two. The middle class provides technical, administrative, and intellectual expertise. It is referred to as "middle" because it serves as a mediator between the two main classes—the upper and the lower—politically, economically, and ideologically. El Bat'hani positions the middle class as a balancing force in society and as a transitional space for upward or downward mobility. Therefore, the disruption or dissolution of the middle class signifies a broader societal imbalance. The book exhibits how the concept of the middle class is the subject of intense debate among theorists. Some argue that due to its positioning between the capitalist bourgeoisie and the working proletariat, the middle class is characterised by certain traits, including a lack of independence, indecisiveness, inconsistency, and a precarious existence between the two dominant classes. El Bat'hani does acknowledge that class structures cannot be defined by economic determinants alone, despite their importance; political and ideological factors are also crucial. Classes do not exist purely as structural entities without acknowledging the presence of "categories" and "strata." Class relations are inherently conflictual, as their existence is defined through struggle and practice. Furthermore, class position is not solely determined by structural factors but also by political and ideological contexts. For instance, certain segments of the working class, such as the labour aristocracy, may align against their class interests, while parts of the petty bourgeoisie may position themselves alongside the working class in specific contexts. Thus, the importance of "categories" and "strata" becomes evident in understanding class dynamics. The book focuses on the middle class in terms of income sources and types, income levels, education and training, positions within the formal division of labour, lifestyles and consumption patterns, and socio-political variables. It also includes behavioural patterns in daily life and engagement with cultural and contemporary perceptions.

One of the most important sections in this chapter is the role of the middle class in peripheral societies.  El Bat'hani provided many examples from Africa and the Middle East, to demonstrate how colonial policies significantly influenced the political and social class structures. Colonial military and civil institutions shaped the social fabric of the colonies through economic, educational, and service-oriented measures, laying the groundwork for post-colonial states. These states were often led by individuals who had been educated and promoted during the colonial period. This subsection of the book predominantly critiques the middle class. It evaluates the performance of the middle class in Sudan, focusing on politicians, business owners, and military officers. The analysis incorporates concepts from rentier capitalism (Marx) and neoliberalism (Harvey) within the framework of peripheral capitalism (Amin). It emphasises the dynamic nature of historical phases and the correlation between social class conflict in Sudan and the rise of neoliberalism, which adapted to the Sudanese context, resulting in a unique form of "Islamic-Sudanese" neoliberalism.

Chapter 3: The Middle Class in Sudan (1956-1989)
This chapter examines the historical process of class formation in Sudan, focusing on the post-independence era from the mid-1950s to 2019. It divides this period into two phases: the first phase spans from 1956 to the rise of the Islamic Front to power in 1989, while the second phase covers the Islamic rule from 1989 until the fall of Omar al-Bashir in April 2019, discussed in detail in the fourth chapter.

El Bat'hani analyses the social structure and state policies that affected the middle class during these periods. He notes that the subject of class formation has sparked significant debate among Sudanese scholars and the broader research community. Scholars often discuss whether class structures in non-Western countries, such as Sudan, resemble those in Western societies. This debate is complicated by historical, economic, and social differences, particularly the lack of a period of industrialisation in many Third World countries, Sudan included. Some scholars, including El Bat'hani, argue that class formation in Sudan began during the era of the Sinnar Sultanate. However, in this book, El Bat'hani begins his analysis of class formation with the Anglo-Egyptian colonial era, which he identifies as the foundation of the modern middle class. This class included but was not limited to, the educated elite, army officers, and small business owners. The colonial administration played a significant role in shaping the economic and social landscape that led to the emergence of the middle class as we recognise it today. During this period, essential developments such as the establishment of the railway, Gordon Memorial College, and the Gezira irrigation project. These initiatives expanded education gradually and created civil service institutions, contributing to the state's "modern" character. The colonial state monopolised legal violence to maintain order and resolve conflicts through its security, police, and judicial systems. Additionally, the British administration established the Sudan Defence Force, which became the nucleus of the modern armed forces, modelled after the British Army. This institution was among the most regulated, contrasting with other state institutions where traditional and modern elements coexisted, particularly in the economy, judiciary, and local governance (e.g. the native administrations).

The gradual expansion of public and private education led to the growth of an educated class that played a significant role in the political movements advocating for self-governance and independence. Key events of this period included the Graduates' Congress, the Advisory Council, the Juba Conference, and the establishment of the Legislative Assembly. Economic initiatives, such as mechanised agriculture during the war and the Self-Government Agreement of 1953, along with the Sudanisation policy of 1954, provided employment opportunities within the state apparatus. These developments facilitated the upward social mobility of various segments of the middle class, known as the "effendiyya" class, which included professionals and civil servants. This class became a driving force in Sudan's socio-political landscape.

In the early decades following the establishment of the colonial regime, the formation of an educated and intellectual middle class in Sudan was heavily influenced by Middle Eastern orientations rather than African ones. Unlike other middle-class leaders who critiqued colonial rule, the Sudanese middle class tended to align with the colonizers, except for the leaders of the anti-colonial front. This alignment further reinforced Arab-Islamic identity in a country marked by diversity. The founders of the University of Khartoum Graduates' Congress in 1938 excluded intellectuals from marginalised regions, and the Sudanisation policy exacerbated this sentiment among educated and middle-class individuals, primarily Nubians at the time, in relation to non-Arab groups in the country.

In this section, El Bat'hani stated that between 1956 and 1989, political leaders were characterised by "integrity", although their policies did not reflect a strategic vision for a national project. Business owners were known for their diligent efforts to expand into new areas, despite attempts to leverage relationships with influential political figures. The performance of military officers, with the exception of the 1958 coup, was largely constrained by inherited militant values from the colonial regime. However, the coup led by former president Ibrahim Abboud opened the door for military, political, and business elites to form the nucleus of cartels and oligarchies. These groups matured in subsequent years, contributing to the decline of the historical role of the middle class. El Bat’hani asserted that in class formation in Sudan, after independence, the initial phase from 1956 to 1977 was marked by economic clientelism. Despite these challenges, the ruling coalition achieved a notable degree of balanced development, especially when compared to other African economies that were severely impacted by the oil and energy crises of the 1970s. These crises led to significant changes in their political systems during a global era that began to witness the rise of neoliberalism. The second phase, from 1977 to 1985, was characterised by a fragile balance of power. One faction sought to utilise state mechanisms and policies to promote independent economic development, while another aimed to reduce the state's role and strengthen free market policies. The influence of the free-market approach grew, especially after the failure of Major Hashim al-Atta's coup in 1971 and the April 1985 uprising. This fragile balance of power persisted until the April uprising, which overthrew the May regime but left the balance unresolved. The rise of the National Islamic Front marked a new phase, blending neoliberal policies with a pragmatic adherence to political Islam.

The book focuses on three elements of the middle class: politicians, small business owners, and military officers.  An initial assessment of the performance of politicians during the first period (1956-1989) reveals both strengths and weaknesses. The political and constitutional system inherited from the colonial rule was not adapted to local realities, lacking a long-term strategic vision. Constitutional doctrine was absent, and fluid political alliances and parties often used their influence to serve their affiliates, sometimes at the expense of the public interest. On the positive side, the period saw the withdrawal of foreign powers and the achievement of political independence, a commitment to holding regular elections, and efforts to address national development challenges. Additionally, El Bath’ani acknowledged that there was support for African liberation movements, the formulation of a national project, adherence to constitutional principles, integrity, transparency, and good governance practices, as well as an independent foreign policy. Middle-class business owners demonstrated a tendency to leverage relationships with government officials, yet struggled to complete the economic cycle of productive capital. They built on the achievements of the first generation of traders, expanding into the agricultural and industrial sectors, and formed partnerships with foreign capital to create connections and gain expertise. Key indicators of their performance included efforts to enhance competitiveness and improve workforce skills through training, an emphasis on adopting technology, and a commitment to social responsibility. Despite these efforts, the reliance on government relationships and the challenges in completing the economic cycle were notable limitations. The other components of the middle class, namely military officers, particularly those in mid-level and senior ranks, are the most inclined to engage in politics and military coups. This political involvement is not limited to these ranks; even lower-ranking officers may be drawn to politics, especially those with radical tendencies. Mid-level officers often seek to break the political monopoly held by ideological groups such as Nasserists and Baathists. In contrast, senior officers tend to act as instruments of the bourgeoisie, executing veto coups to resist change and support the existing social order. They generally oppose expanding the base of power and wealth distribution. An initial assessment of the performance of military officers from 1956 to 1989 reveals several key points. The 1958 coup highlighted the emergence of officers with political party loyalties, which contributed to the intensification of the civil war in the southern part of the country. The professional military's insistence on national unity often overlooked the demands of the southern regions and other provinces. Positive indicators include adherence to a national combat doctrine, respect for the constitution and the rule of law, and maintaining military hierarchy. Continuous training efforts were made to enhance combat efficiency. However, the last years of the May regime (1982-1985) saw deviations from these principles, as noted in the Armed Forces Memorandum. Although El Bat’hani’s analysis oscillates between political economy and political Islam, he remains mindful that discussions of class formation and the middle class in Sudan must also consider other determining factors such as ethnicity, regionalism, gender and religion. Additionally, he acknowledges that Sudanese societies are in a continuous state of change, and social class analysis may not be suitable for understanding social stratification and social change due to the rapid transformation of societies and its profound impact on the determinants of social class. However, the importance of class analysis lies in its ability to stimulate debate on the formation of the middle class in Sudan and its contribution to Sudanese politics and the ongoing conflict.

Chapter 4: The Middle Class in Sudan during the Inqadh Era (1989-2019)
In this chapter, El Bat’hani proposes dividing the three-decade period of the Inqadh regime into three internal phases, during which the middle class underwent profound transformations with significant economic and political implications that remain unclear and warrant further empirical research. The first phase was characterised by the destabilisation and reduction of the influence of the traditional middle class (professionals, urbanites, and intellectuals). This was followed by the infiltration and establishment of new groups benefiting from aggressive economic liberalisation policies, which led to the settlement and empowerment of Islamic movement cadres and their affiliates in high social and occupational ranks. During the oil decade (1999-2011), the rentier class expanded, and other groups outside the ruling Islamic sphere found their place through connections with local, regional, and international networks of interests. In the third phase, the end of the oil decade with the secession of the South in 2011 revealed the depth of the economic crisis, a result of exploitative rentier economic policies and the failure of the ruling Islamic elite to manage the crisis. The Arab Spring further exacerbated the situation, enabling youth groups to play a key role in overthrowing the regime in April 2019. During the Inqadh regime, the middle class experienced significant transformations in their social mobility mechanisms. One key mechanism was employment in the civil service, often achieved through processes of purges and dismissals justified as being in the public interest and facilitated by nepotism and favouritism networks. Education also played a crucial role, as it often led to civil service employment. Additionally, economic growth had a notable impact on the middle class, although this period also saw an increase in emigration, with many individuals seeking work opportunities abroad. These dynamics had profound economic and political implications, highlighting the need for further empirical research to fully understand their effects.

During the Inqadh era, waves of dismissals were a constant feature for over twenty years. This period began with the slogan "loyalty before competence" as a means to secure power, followed by the policy of "empowerment," which continued until President Bashir announced the liberation of the civil service in February 2012. These dismissals affected members of all national political parties and were used to settle political scores and personal vendettas through the second constitutional decree, emergency regulations, and the authority of the Revolutionary Command Council, which later delegated its powers to officials. The decree stated that the President of the Revolutionary Command Council, under emergency powers, or any delegated authority, could terminate the service of any public employee while preserving their post-service rights. Naturally, there is no comparison between dismissals for the public good in democratic periods and those under authoritarian regimes. During the Inqadh era, the professional, labour, and artisanal sectors experienced significant upheaval, which had a catastrophic impact on the middle class. El Bath’ani articulated that when reviewing decisions regarding job dismissals or retirements, it is important to distinguish between two types: the first type involves dismissals for economic or administrative reasons (such as privatisation, job elimination, or restructuring), while the second type involves dismissals for the public good. Dismissals continued under the policies of liberalisation and market economy, affecting many people in various professional fields such as medicine, engineering, and administration, under the guise of public interest or job elimination as stipulated in the civil service law. The number of women dismissed increased due to the privatisation of public institutions. These measures provided numerous opportunities for the impoverished members of the Islamic movement to ascend to the middle class. Members of the lower strata before the coup of the Islamic Front rose to stable or influential positions within the middle class. Those who found themselves in stable positions with the new regime ascended to influential ranks. Meanwhile, the influential members of the middle class from the Islamic movement gained unrestricted power and influence, unbound by constitutional and legal constraints. The deliberate restructuring of the middle class during the Inqadh era significantly contributed to the instability and upheavals experienced during the transitional period after April 2019, from the October 2021 coup to the April 2023 conflict. This restructuring affected the political dynamics and alignments of both the regime-affiliated and opposition middle classes, as well as various interest groups and networks. The Inqadh regime inherited numerous unresolved issues from previous governments, which hindered the country's progress and resource management. Despite rhetoric about breaking ties with foreign influences, the regime's actions often contradicted these claims, leading to the secession of the South and a decline in national unity. The state's authority weakened, and the country's resources were exploited by regional and international interests. The Inqadh regime prioritised maintaining power over national integrity, leading to the fragmentation and weakening of the political class. This was achieved by dismantling the middle class and its political, union, and civil society cadres, thereby ensuring the regime's continued dominance. 

The 1989 coup by the Islamic Front highlighted the fragility and disarray of the political class. The political forces' confusion in response to the coup, despite having signed the Charter for the Defence of Democracy, which required opposition to military takeovers, is a clear example of this weakness. The only effective opposition came from professional unions, such as the University of Khartoum Professors' Union, the Doctors' Union, and the Railway Workers' Union. Politically, the National Democratic Alliance emerged as a broad coalition of political and union forces, initially advocating for a "protected uprising" and forming armed groups to operate from abroad. However, these efforts failed, and some parties eventually cooperated with the Islamic regime before the Sudan People's Liberation Movement signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. This agreement allowed political parties to return to the country and participate in the National Assembly, albeit reflecting their weakened state. As political repression and economic conditions worsened, youth movements became increasingly active in mobilizing the public, calling for a break from the old political order. These youth groups spearheaded political and peaceful protests, starting in rural areas in December 2018 and continuing with determination and organization, ultimately leading to the overthrow of the regime in April 2019. The business class experienced significant regional and international changes that helped solidify the new regime's foundations. Concurrently, a capitalist class began to emerge, characterized by a blend of Islamic and market economies. Islamic banks which initiated the Islamisation of the economy in the late 1970s, became more prominent during the Inqadh era. With the country facing international isolation, it turned eastward to China and Southeast Asia. Amidst the neoliberal wave, new companies and business owners emerged to circumvent Western sanctions. Domestically, privatisation policies and the reduction of the public sector opened opportunities for the private sector, leading to an unprecedented increase in the number of companies and business owners. However, this economic expansion did not align with social liberalisation. The business class lost many of the ethical values that had previously distinguished it, paving the way for crony capitalism, where loyalty was often displayed to gain favour and translate it into economic advantages.

During the Inqadh era, the professional performance of the military institution declined significantly, and its identity and structure transformed from a national army to a jihadist force. This shift in identity was evident as the military began to reflect the interests of the Islamic State rather than a national one, leading to the dismissal of over 1,000 nationalist officers within a month of the Islamic Front's rise to power. The standards for evaluating military officers, such as adherence to the constitution, combat doctrine, hierarchy, and continuous training, were abandoned. Instead, the willingness to sacrifice for the "civilisational project" became the new criterion. The regime did not hesitate to mobilise and arm ethnic groups, organising them into militias to counter opposition movements in Darfur and suppress urban protests. As internal conflicts among Islamists over power intensified, these militias were used to target opposing factions. The regime's leaders' ties with regional powers opened the country to exploitation, offering its resources to influential regional circles. Consequently, the "guiding army" officers became facilitators for foreign companies, and the focus on training and combat doctrine became a thing of the past.

Chapter 5: Conclusion: New Alignment or Return to the Old?
In this chapter, El Bat’hani concludes with the December Revolution in Sudan that overthrew the National Congress Party NCP (Sudan's former ruling parting) and ended an era of the Islamist regime. With its slogans of "Freedom, Peace, and Justice," driven by the vibrant forces of the youth movement and resistance committees, the December Revolution aimed to usher in a new phase characterised by a vision that transcends the mistakes and missteps of the past in both leadership and practice. However, the economic and political challenges left in its wake were not adequately addressed. This situation resulted in the country becoming a "backyard" for regional and global powers tied to cartels and interest groups, both military and civilians. Although the professional forces mobilised the grassroots that led to the removal of the former regime's leaders, the political leadership, during the Transitional Government phase, struggled to manage the outcomes of this change, allowing for rapid and unregulated shifts largely influenced by internal and external forces, which eventually sparked and fuelled the ongoing war in Sudan.  In his conclusion, El Bat'hani postulates that the historical responsibility for the fragmentation of national unity and the exacerbation of internal conflicts, as well as the failure to sustain the December Revolution, largely lies with the Islamic Inqadh regime. However, a significant portion of this failure is also attributable to the political class, which draws its leadership from the middle class. The middle class failed to fulfil its historical role, especially compared to the achievements of the middle classes in other countries. The book's thesis, which remains open to review and testing, posits that the general fragility of the middle class and the rise of the influential Islamist faction to power, along with other factors, contributed to Sudan's prolonged instability. Moreover, he ends by stating that it is now time for the political class to engage in self-critique, reassessing its theories and practices since independence.

The book traces the development of the middle class through various historical periods, offering a rich context. It employs both qualitative and quantitative methods to provide a well-rounded analysis. However, the lack of comprehensive data on income distribution and social surveys in Sudan presents a challenge. As a result, the current findings are somewhat speculative, as a comprehensive measurement of the middle class in Sudan would require extensive data on education, employment, and consumption patterns. This data would help assess the stability of different middle-class segments, such as professionals, artisans, and private sector workers, and compare their roles with other economic groups. It would also shed light on the rural-urban divide and the relationship between the middle class, income inequality, economic welfare, and real expenditure growth.

Despite these limitations, the book highlights general indicators of the middle class's decline in Sudan over the past three decades. While the interdisciplinary approach is a strength, it may also make the book complex and potentially challenging for readers without a background in socio-economic and political studies.

Overall, I believe this book is a valuable resource for anyone interested in understanding the socio-economic dynamics of Sudanese society. It provides deep insights into the historical and contemporary role of the middle class, making it essential reading for scholars, policymakers, and anyone interested in Sudan’s socio-political landscape. Despite the challenges posed by data limitations, El Bat’hani’s work stands out for its depth, relevance, and comprehensive analysis.