The war for recruits: Co-optation and the soft-landing paradigm
They identified themselves as ‘revolutionaries’. Born and raised under an authoritarian regime, they joined protests challenging decades of massive social engineering and its political Islam ideology, surprising the Islamists who had long sought to shape public opinion. On April 11, 2019, their protests succeeded.
However, after the protests culminated in Omar al-Bashir being ousted, the revolutionaries’ dreams were quickly shattered. The generation that once chanted "Freedom, peace, and justice; revolution is the people's choice" soon felt disillusioned.
Soft landing disguised in pragmatism
The young protesters had hoped for a completely new direction, but the change in governance that followed was merely cosmetic, reflecting the power of corrupt technocrats and Islamists influencing the course of events. Instead of moving steadily towards, "social justice," the Forces of Freedom and Change, a coalition of civilian groups that fought alongside the young revolutionaries, entered negotiations with the Transitional Military Council, in reality a body consisting of the highest ranking officers from the ousted Islamist regime’s security committee. The negotiators were walking a a tightrope, aiming to balance popular aspirations, elite and regional interests, and the constraints imposed by global economic systems.
The revolutionary youth movement’s resistance and the public demand for accountability posed an existential threat to traditional hegemonic politics and the power to determine the people’s destiny. Therefore, the first step taken by former president Bashir’s cronies in the TMC was to co-opt parts of the political structure and leadership to defuse the threat. It is important to note that this included military figures and powerful businessmen with substantial economic interests.
The term "soft-landing" resurfaced, often cloaked in pragmatism, arguing that radical change was unrealistic, costly, and would bring unnecessary bloodshed. Even regional and global actors urged the revolutionaries to hold their horses. For example, Anwar Gargash, the UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, tweeted that “this transition should find a careful balance between the aspirations of the people and the stability of institutions.” The UAE and Saudi Arabia expressed firm support for the Transitional Military Council, aiming to mitigate the revolution's impact, a stance observed by others, such as the European Council on Foreign Relations. Jean-Baptiste Gallopin, former fellow in the council, described it as “the axis under the guise of stability...enabling the TMC’s repression of demonstrators on June 3, 2019.”
The term "soft-landing" resurfaced, often cloaked in pragmatism, arguing that radical change was unrealistic, costly, and would bring unnecessary bloodshed.
The repression Gallopin referred to is the Khartoum massacre, where the TMC’s forces killed over 100 peaceful protesters. Shortly after the massacre, an agreement was made to share power with the newly formed TMC, supported by regional powers and significant aid packages—a "lifeline for the junta." This partnership gave legitimacy to the military junta and the new economic elite, enabling them to retain the resources gained through corruption.
Faced with resistance, power-sharing negotiators had to engage with the entrenched business elite and justify their partnership. They aimed to protect their gains by attracting individuals to oppose radical change. This situation has limited options to either passivity or compliance. One good example is the scandalous Elfakhir Company.
Discontent within the leadership of the popular movement quickly emerged. While some argued the deal was the only way forward, many saw it as a betrayal. Protesters once again chanted slogans, this time with both conviction and disappointment: “O-Qahatta[1], how much did you sell the blood for?”
By gradually abandoning the revolution’s aspirations and settling for a soft landing, Sudan’s elite not only obstructed the transition but jeopardized the entire idea of political reforms and, later, the credibility of the civilian transitional government. Accountability was not just a slogan for the protesters; it was an existential demand.
A gentleman’s agreement
The term "soft-landing" originated with former American special envoy Princeton N. Lyman[2], who emphasized the need for an inclusive process involving various political factions, including elements of the previous regime, Islamist kleptocrats, and opposition groups. At the time, many international actors believed a comprehensive national dialogue was the only way to resolve Sudan’s issues.
To understand how elements within the coalition were co-opted after the mass movement expanded in early 2019, it's essential to consider the historical context. Under the previous regime, state-owned companies were privatized as part of structural adjustment programs (SAPs). However, this was done non-competitively, with regime figures buying these companies at low prices, creating a new wealthy class that came to dominate the market. Al-Bashir maintained their loyalty by allowing them to profit without interference, fostering a culture of cronyism in Sudan.
However, Bashir’s decision to remain in office challenged this unholy alliance. Despite benefiting from his leadership, these elites sought to protect their interests by opposing him and aligning with the winds of change. Although Bashir tried to stabilize the economy by removing subsidies and raising bread prices, which led to student protests in the peripheries, it triggered a popular uprising in December 2018.
Co-opting to stay in power: Legitimizing the perpetuators
The threat of a popular uprising led to efforts to strengthen alternative power centers and maintain existing power structures. This resulted in a consociational state-building model focused on stability, through consultations between economic elites and new FCC members with the TMC having the upper hand. The focus shifted from establishing strong democratic institutions to prioritizing economic stability and attracting foreign investment, led by former Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdok, who, just three months prior to the protests, had rejected an offer to serve as finance minister in October 2018.
The threat of a popular uprising led to efforts to strengthen alternative power centers and maintain existing power structures.
As various political players sought to justify their collaboration with the military as a means to support the democratic transition, competition for recruits became increasingly contentious. This weakened the movement’s cohesion and affected the mood and understanding of many inexperienced participants.
Some attribute it to the disjuncture in the political spectrum, but this value-loaded concept focusing on age or ideological conflict lines alone is misleading. There were two different approaches: One led to power-sharing agreements, while the other demanded a complete transfer of power to civilian rule and the rule of law.
Controlling the narrative, controlling the masses
William Gamson’s definition of co-optation as “Challengers gaining access to the public policy process but without achieving actual policy changes” could help us understand these strategies. This definition helps explain certain political strategies, such as the “time to build, not to resist” narrative. An example of this can be found in the Minister of Federal Government’s legislation from November 2019 which outlined the establishment of Change and Service Committees. Many saw this as an implicit attempt to dissolve the resistance committees which operated independently of traditional sectarian politics that constituted many of the FFC alliances.
Less than a year after, the resistance committees (RCs) marched to the palace, handing a memorandum demanding retribution, justice and economic reforms. Despite this, leaders of the transitional government, praised the people’s efforts and hailed the “December Revolution” as a victory. This move only made the chants calling to end the partnership with the TMC grow even louder. To the elite, pragmatism clearly was more important than dealing with injustice and corruption. Sudanese researcher Razaz Bashir, wrote “This change in the face of the regime did not reflect much on the violations that the security forces continued to commit against the revolutionaries on the ground. It was the civilian elite’s perspective of these violations that changed".[i]
Were the young revolutionaries entering the sphere of politics naïve to think that they could dismantle the cronyism?
Entering a new phase
What happened in the aftermath of Sudan’s December revolution begs the question: What is the difference between a revolution and a transition? While a revolution promises radical change, a transition is a slower process often preserving existing power dynamics. The case of the December revolution shows how the distinction can be blurry, especially when counter-tactics and interference in the shape of co-optation comes into play.
On 25 October 2021, the military branch of the civilian-military transitional government denounced the partnership with their civilian counterparts, declaring a state of emergency. The resistance committees, having not yet given up hope in the revolution, met the coup with loud protests and chants: ‘No negotiation, no legitimacy, no compromise.” And so, a new phase marked by different competing narratives and visions for Sudan’s future began – the so-called battle of charters. Have we learned from this experience, or is the soft-landing approach still the main narrative?
To be continued.
This Sudanese Perspectives blog post is written by Taharqa Elnour. He is a Sudanese political activist and human rights defender.
This blog post is the first of two from Elnour, and is part of a series focusing on different aspects of youth’s responses to the war, and on the crucial role they can play in pushing for and building sustainable peace in Sudan. The series is the outcome of a SNAC workshop that brought together a large group of SNAC fellows and young Sudanese researchers and activists. The views expressed in this post are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the SNAC project or CMI.
[1] Qahatta: the Arabic abbreviation for The Forces of Freedom and Change coalition formed in January 2019 consist of political parties and civil society groups that signed the Declaration of Freedom and Change
Pathway to National Dialogue in Sudan
[i] https://cihrs-rowaq.org/citizenship-rights-in-sudan-discourse-and-practice-in-revolution-and-war/
Citizenship rights in Sudan: Discourse and practice in the paths of revolution and war
